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ABSTRACT 
 
The importance of political institutions for economic growth and social well-being has been 
demonstrated in a number of studies. Societies in which agents trust that other agents will collabo-
rate in establishing and maintaining efficient institutions produce more social benefits.  Yet there is 
still no solution to the problem known as the social trap, namely how societies can establish effi-
cient institutions when the agents lack social trust. The emerging consensus on Acemoglu & Robin-
son’s model is supported by observational data but micro-level data produced in controlled circum-
stances are absent. To shed light on this perennial problem, a set of laboratory experiments were 
carried with both high and low trust agents. The main result is that when endowed with strong, 
socially efficient institutions at the outset, even groups of agents with low social trust are capable of 
using political inclusion to maintain and also to strengthen the socially efficient institutions thereby 
achieving collectively high-yielding outcomes. These experiments provide the first experimental 
support for the importance of strong institutions for developing societies. 
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Around 1990, three major works had a profound impact on the analysis of the importance of insti-
tutions in the social sciences, namely, James B. March and Johan P. Olsen’s (1989) Rediscovering Insti-
tutions, Douglass C. North’s (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, and El-
linor Ostrom’s (1990) Governing the Commons. Collectively they challenged the then dominant societal 
view in studies of social and economic outcomes. The main paradigms in the social sciences then 
(for example, Pluralism, Elitism and Marxism) all argued that societal variables such as economic 
power configurations, systems of social stratifications, or the structure of class divisions were cen-
tral in explaining political and thereby social and economic outcomes. Contrary to this, the institu-
tional approach turned the causal logic around by arguing that the character of a society’s political 
institutions to a large extent determines its economic and social development: In short, “the rules 
of the game” should have a more central role in social science research.  
In this vein, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robison and their collaborators1 have taken on the 
“million-dollar” question transgressing economics, comparative history, political economy, interna-
tional development, and comparative politics: Why are some nations rich and others are poor? 
Their recent opus magnum (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012) synthesizes a vast literature from Adam 
Smith (1776) to Douglass C. North (1982) and Robert Bates (2001), as well as from Weber ([1904-
05] 1958) to Lipset (1959) and Tabellini (2010), and couples it with detailed historical analysis and 
come up with a parsimonious explanation. Inclusive (market based) economic institutions create 
sustained increasing prosperity but only inclusive (pluralistic and centralized) political institutions 
are able to guarantee the reproduction of such economic institutions in the long run. Pluralistic 
political institutions that safeguard dispersion of political power among a large share of the popula-
tion (together with some amount of centralized authority) explain why some countries have much 
higher living standards and wellbeing than others. Getting “politics right” as it were, is a necessary 
condition for pro-growth economic institutions to be sustained over not only decades but centu-
ries. Problem solved? Perhaps, but not quite yet. 
                                                     
1.
 The literature we refer to includes: Acemoglu (2005, 2008); Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson & Robinson (2010); Ace-
moglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001, 202, 2003, 2005); Acemoglu & Robinson (2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2006a, 2006b, 
2008); García-Jimeno & Robinson (2011); Robinson (1998). 
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The issue remains to explain how societies caught in vicious circles of exclusionary political institu-
tions and low societal trust and therefore extractive and usually destructive economics, can switch 
gear into inclusionary, high-trust politics sustaining inclusive, growth-generating economic institu-
tions.  
Take widespread corruption as an instance of “bad” social outcomes creating a sub-optimal equilib-
rium, or social trap. The supposedly “benevolent principals” are typically the ones who stand to 
gain the most from rents and therefore have no incentives to change the system (Aidt, 2003; John-
ston, 2005; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Teorell 2007; cf. Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2012). The same 
logic undergirds Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) explanation for why nations do not simply adopt 
the best institutions. Leaders of extractive systems simply have little to gain and a lot to lose from 
political and economic institutions that generate sustained economic growth. A little disturbingly 
for the Acemoglu and Robinson model, increased political inclusion in many countries over the 
past 30 years have far from always remedied the system. Corrupt politicians often stand a good 
chance of getting re-elected by structuring incentives (Golden 2003), machine politics (e.g. Stokes 
2005) and/or using clientelism (Gonzales-Ocantos 2011; Nichter 2008; Kitschelt & Wilkinson eds. 
2007; Magaloni 2006; Stokes & Dunning 2005; Weghorst & Lindberg 2011). Street level tax bu-
reaucrats or policemen, poor and atomized voters or other agents at the bottom also have no incen-
tive to refrain from corrupt practices because it makes no sense to be the only honest player in a 
“rotten game”.2  
This leads to an even more difficult problem that has been labeled as a second-order collective action 
problem (Lichbach 1997; Ostrom 1998; Rothstein  2005). “All” the agents may well understand 
that they would stand to gain from establishing inclusive political and economic institutions, but 
they have little reason to cooperate unless they trust that most other agents would not defect in the 
very process of creating the institutions meant to facilitate cooperative behavior. (Olson 1963; 
Rawls 1971, 240; Levi 2007; Lichbach 2005). Hence, establishing credible institutions that facilitates 
co-operation, such as the rule of law and an impartial public administration, is in itself a (second-
order) collective action problem. Consistent with the Acemoglu and Robinson model, empirical 
                                                     
2
 This is also consistent with the evidence that democratic elections do not necessarily work against corruption (Teorell, 
2007). 
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studies have shown that it is the existence of fair, impartial and universal institutions that generates 
the  social trust needed for solving problems of collective action (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006, 2011; New-
ton & Delhey 2005; Norrs 2012;  Rothstein & Stolle 2008; Rothstein & Eek 2008). Yet, this type of 
knowledge does not solve the policy problem how societies with low social trust can ever produce 
such socially efficient institutions because these “meta-institutions” are themselves public goods 
and are thus suffering from the standard problem of defection and/or non-cooperation. 
The answer of Acemoglu and Robinson (e.g. 2012: 430-431) is that small initial differences resulting 
from institutional drift (aka genetic drift) and sometimes idiosyncratic choices at critical junctures 
make similar societies diverge radically and generate vast differences in outcomes both in terms of 
political and economic institutions. Once these institutions develop, a virtuous self-reinforcing (but 
not irreversible) cycle typically develops in the good cases, much along the lines of studies of indi-
vidual self-reinforcing institutions (e.g. Lindberg 2006). In the less fortunate societies of the world, 
extractive economic institutions combine with exclusionary political structures to perpetuate pov-
erty and misrule. Yet, one critical source of uncertainty in Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis is that 
there are many covariates in differences between cases such as the Tokugawa shogunate and the 
Chinese emperor in 1853; the Melaka, Ambon, and Banten in 1620s South-East Asia; England and 
Spain in 1588, Botswana and Ghana in 1940, the Leles and the Bushongs in 17th century Congo. 
While natural experiments in history as well as advanced statistical modeling can provide powerful 
evidence, we still need to isolate the operative mechanism and test it in controlled circumstances at 
the micro level. This can only be done in a laboratory environment. 
The second problem is that while abysmal historical differences in political inclusion between say 
the United States and Haiti, can be used to explain vast differences in economic institutions, social 
trust, and welfare, it is much more difficult to ascertain if countries by introducing similar levels of 
political pluralism can in effect reach higher levels of trust, effective economic institutions and wel-
fare. For example, the experiences from trying to export rule-of-law type of institutions from the 
United States (or other countries) to developing nations have not been very successful (Messick 
1999; Andrews 2010). 
This second issue also obliges us to seek micro-level evidence produced in controlled circumstanc-
es, on how low-trust, defect-prone individuals (typical for poor societies with weak and/or extrac-
tive institutions) respond to changes in political institutions. Do groups of low-trust individuals use 
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political inclusion to destroy economic institutions that would serve their long-term interest be-
cause they will get short-term individual gain, or does the experience of efficient economic institu-
tions make them opt to reproduce such conditions? 
Previous laboratory experiments by Eriksson & Strimling (2012) show that groups consisting of 
low-trust, defect-prone individuals (akin to poor societies) seem incapable of building strong, effi-
cient political and economic institutions despite the fact that they need those to achieve better soci-
etal outcomes.3 This supports the standard N-persons prisoners’ dilemma argument and corrobo-
rates the Acemoglu and Robinson model. But Eriksson and Strimling’s study does not speak to the 
issue of how groups of low trust, non-cooperative individuals respond to exogenously imposed 
strong and efficient economic institutions. The latter is an approximate equivalent to the institu-
tional drift and path-dependent argument resulting in individuals being born into societies with 
varying institutions. The available micro-level evidence produced in the controlled setting of a la-
boratory experiment, hence, cannot test the most critical causal link advanced by the institutionalist 
literature in general, and the Acemoglu and Robinson model in particular.  
With this is mind, we have carried out a set of laboratory experiments designed to test directly what 
happens with socially efficient institutions when participants vary in their initial level of social trust 
under conditions of political pluralism and inclusive economic institutions. The experiments are 
thus designed to test, at the micro level, the operative mechanism in the Acemoglu and Robinson 
model by creating a pure public goods game and removing all the covariates of historical and ob-
servational designs. This paper reports and analyzes the data from the experiments.  
 There are two main results. First, the results of the experiments replicate the findings from the 
Eriksson & Strimling study. We show that with initially weak economic institutions groups consist-
ing of uncooperative types are less successful than cooperative types in strengthening the institu-
tions to generate better societal outcomes – despite the fact that the low-trust, uncooperative types 
are in greater need of stronger institutions. Hence, the results corroborate the existence of social 
                                                     
3
. In the same series of experiments, the authors also show that groups of high-trust, cooperative individuals manage to 
build and sustain such efficient institutions. 
 
 7 
traps and the historical record of vicious circles in terms of weak and inefficient institutions leading 
to bad social outcomes recreating the conditions for their continued existence.  
Second, our  results demonstrate that if given strong and efficient institutions at the outset, even 
the groups consisting of low-trust, uncooperative individuals succeed in not only maintaining these 
institutions but under conditions of political pluralism and choice akin to the Acemoglu and Robin-
son model, opt to rebuild and re-strengthen them in situations when institutional decay and free-
riding threaten desirable outcomes. These results have clear policy-relevant implications. While any 
number of other factors may circumvent the effect, exogenous creation and “imposition” of strong 
and efficient institutions have the potential of disrupting and replacing vicious circles created by 
social traps. 
The Model - An Iterative Public Goods Game  
Different from many other situations social scientists study, social traps lend themselves to be 
translated into strategically equivalent experimental situations in public goods (PG) games. While it 
may be that political scientists are sometimes “nearly obsessed” with external validity of experi-
ments (McDermott 2002: 334), the use of this approach is less controversial for studying social 
traps than for most others areas of political science. We also agree with Druckman and Kam (2011) 
that external validity should be assessed in light of the entire research agenda, existing facts, and the 
specifics of the theory. Our study involves testing highly specific hypotheses of observable behav-
ior of individuals in strategic settings that are easily manipulated based on a well-developed theory 
with clear predictions. The use of students (as in our case) may even strengthen the experimental 
realism in our design that relies on induced value theory and involves relatively complicated instruc-
tions since students are educated, in need of small amounts of money, and used to receiving in-
structions from professors (Guala 2005: 33; Friedman and Sunder 1994: 39-40). Finally, the results 
reported here are consistent with, and corroborates, the Acemoglu and Robinson model of the 
origins of rich and poor nations; with the historical record of North-Western Europe creating effi-
cient and credible political and economic institutions first, and expansion of political pluralism then 
reinforcing and sustaining these achievements; as well as with the consistent pattern over time in 
differences between corrupt and relatively corruption-free countries.  
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Inclusive Economic Institutions 
We use a similar set-up to Eriksson & Strimling (2012) in constructing the PG game.  In our im-
plementation of the PG game, agents are divided into groups of four or five. Each agent obtains an 
endowment of ten units. The agents then decide individually how much of their endowment to 
contribute to the common pot and keeps the rest. After these decisions have been made, the com-
mon pot grows by a multiplicative factor 1.6 for groups of size four and 2 for groups of size five. 
The common pot is then distributed equally to all agents in the group. This means that for each 
unit contributed, each agent receives 0.4 units. This game, which we shall refer to as the unregulated 
PG game, is a collective action problem because the social optimum is achieved when everyone 
contributes their entire endowments to the common pot but each agent increases her own payoff 
by keeping her endowment instead of contributing to the common pot. In a stylized fashion, it also 
represents Acemoglu and Robinson’s inclusive economic institutions where everyone are allowed 
to participate in economic activity, invest, save, and contribute. In the PG game, this economic 
inclusion is perfect and it is not influenced by any possible covariates. Our setup is thus designed to 
generate exactly the operative conditions in the Acemoglu and Robinson model. 
 We then take advantage of the fact that lab experiments consistently find that some individuals are 
far more cooperative than others (Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2007; Gächter & Thöni 2005; Rooij et al. 
2009; Sally 1995; Yamagishi 1986). In a non-technical language, we first let the participants play the 
unregulated PG game repeatedly (six rounds) to identify two groups of individuals: those who tend 
to behave in trustful ways towards others and cooperate in generating collectively beneficial out-
comes; and those who tend to be uncooperative types and not trust others. These groups are then 
implemented in practice by sorting the individuals by the sum of their contributions in the unregu-
lated PG game so that the four or five individuals with the highest contribution is assigned to the 
cooperative group and the four or five with the lowest contribution to the uncooperative group. If 
the number of participants resulted in one group of four and one with five individuals, we random-
ized whether the cooperative or the uncooperative group would contain five individuals. The com-
parative statistics of the individuals we classified as in one of these two groups is found in Table 1. 
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Table 1. MEAN CONTRIBUTION IN THE UNREGULATED PG 
 All participants Participants classified as 
uncooperative types 
Participants classified as 
cooperative types 
P (two-tailed) 
Mean 6.28 4.12 8.48 <.001 
S. D.  2.9 2.1 1.6  
 
The unregulated PG game is thus used to generate a political “state of nature” where there are no 
rewards or punishments for being uncooperative (except the possible higher returns if everyone 
cooperatives). This allows individuals to reveal their “true” inclinations when unconstrained by 
political institutions in a condition of economic inclusion and equal buying-power. In the subse-
quent stage of the laboratory experiment, we let the cooperative types represent individuals in the 
high-trust, economically prosperous nations in the Acemoglu and Robinson model. The uncooper-
ative types represent the citizens caught in vicious circles of nations staying poor as a result of col-
lective action failures. This division, based on the unregulated PG game, sets up for the possibility 
of testing directly the operative mechanism of the Acemoglu and Robinson model. 
Varying the Strength of Institutions 
After sorting individuals in groups of cooperative and uncooperative types, we now introduce an 
institution to both types of groups in order to regulate their behavior. The strength of this institu-
tion can be varied exogenously in the laboratory setting. In its weak form it generates relative pov-
erty and in its strong form it generates prosperity for the individuals of the group. The structure of 
this institution is modeled on the framework provided by Ostrom (1990). It has previously been 
used by Eriksson and Strimling (2012). 
 Operational rule: The institution stipulates what is the smallest acceptable level of contribu-
tion to the common pot. Let A denote this acceptability threshold. 
 Monitoring: Every agent can monitor at the cost of C (set to 1) units. If she chooses to mon-
itor, then another agent is randomly drawn and is checked for rule compliance. This was 
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implemented so that any one agent could never be monitored more than once in a single 
round. 
 Reward: If someone who has contributed less than the acceptable level of A units (hence-
forth a “cheater”) is monitored, the successful monitor obtains a reward of R (set to 3) 
units. The reward is financed by the common pot after it has been multiplied, so rewards 
redistribute resources to successful monitors. 
 Punishment: An agent who is found out as a cheater is automatically punished by a fine of F 
units. These units disappear, so for the rest of the group the punishment is associated nei-
ther with a direct cost nor a direct benefit. 
After the initial unregulated PG game, we had sorted the participants into 20 groups of cooperative 
types, and 20 that consisted of uncooperative individuals. The groups were randomly assigned to 
one of two different treatments, either starting with a weak or a strong institution: 
 Weak institution: Acceptance threshold starts at A=1 and the fine starts at F=2.  
 Strong institution: Acceptance threshold starts at A=8 and the fine starts at F=9. 
Hence, one set of ten groups from each type were provided with initial conditions of strong eco-
nomic institutions regulating behavior towards cooperation and generating more prosperity. The 
other set of groups from each type of individuals were given initial conditions of weak economic 
institutions that would initially generate relative poverty for the group. In total we had 40 groups of 
individuals conducting the following experiment as displayed in Table 2.  
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TABLE 2. TYPES OF INDIVIDUALS AND INITIAL CONDITIONS 
  Initial Institutions  
  Strongly encourages cooperation Weakly encourages cooperation 
Type of Individual Cooperative 10 groups 10 groups 
Uncooperative 10 groups 10 groups 
 
Within cooperative and uncooperative groups, participants played twenty rounds of the regulated 
PG game. But before this, we have to introduce “political inclusion”. 
Political Inclusion 
In the Acemoglu and Robinson model political pluralism, perhaps more appropriately labeled polit-
ical inclusion4, plays a critical role as the principal way in which inclusive and societally efficient 
economic institutions are sustained. In order to test the operative mechanism we therefore need to 
include a requisite political institution: voting. It is true that Acemoglu and Robinson carefully point 
out that voting or democracy is not required in their model. Nevertheless, in the laboratory setting 
of this experiment, voting fulfills the requirement stipulated by their theory: To politically empower 
a broad swath of economic agents so they can safeguard the institutions that generate increased 
prosperity. This is exactly what we make possible with voting in the regulated PG game.  
After every two rounds, agents get to vote on whether to change the value of a given institutional 
parameter. There are three options: first, raising the parameter value by one unit; second, keeping it 
at its current level; third, lowering it by one unit. If either raising or lowering the parameter value is 
                                                     
4
 While in our stylized situation voting based on the principle one person – one vote represents the condition of political 
inclusion and we argue this is a good approximation, it should be noted that Acemoglu and Robinson (e.g. 2012: 460) 
correctly argue that in the real world a country can also be nominally democratic without having the requisite political 
inclusion/pluralism. As is well established, many factors related to economic power, clientelism, political corruption, 
lawlessness and so forth can skew the distribution of power to the extent of making extractive economic institutions 
attractive and viable for a small elite.  
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strictly more popular than any of the other two options, the value is changed accordingly. Agents 
are allowed to vote for the acceptance threshold (A) and fine (F). The acceptance threshold is lim-
ited to at most A = 9, so that agents can afford to both monitor and contribute the minimum level. 
No limit is imposed on the fine. We shall refer to this scenario as the regulated PG game with vot-
ing.  
 Viewed as one-shot games, the unregulated PG game has a unique pure Nash equilibrium with 
zero contributions. The regulated PG game with voting typically has a mixed equilibrium where 
players either try to cheat by contributing zero or contribute at the lowest acceptable level of A 
units. These equilibria are differentiated both by the probability with which we would expect people 
to cheat and how much they contribute when they do. Putting these two factors together it is pos-
sible to determine how efficient the institution is at creating cooperation for a one shot game. 
Eriksson and Strimling (2012) performed an equilibrium analysis showing that as long as the fine 
(F) is high enough to ensure a mixed equilibrium, the institution is more efficient the higher A is. 
However, in our experiment, the games are repeated a number of times and they include voting 
which allows for several other more complex equilibria. Therefore, this analysis serves merely as a 
reference. The fact that stronger institutions give rise to more contributions will be tested explicitly 
in the result section.   
We investigated the effect of manipulating the starting values of the acceptance threshold A and 
the size of the fine F for different groups. We kept the reward for successful monitoring fixed at R 
= 3 units. We then studied the behavior of the four groups over 20 iterative regulated PG games 
with voting.5 
Results 
We use the acceptance threshold (A), the level of the fine (F), as well as the actual contributions to 
assess the level of successful cooperation to achieve greater public good across the four groups 
with varying conditions. Our focus is on the acceptance threshold, because once the fine is large 
                                                     
5
 Participants were not informed that they were divided into groups depending on their contribution. They were simply 
told that they would be placed into new groups. Nor did they know how many rounds they were going to play, or which 
one was the last one. They were not allowed to communicate during the experiment and the protocol followed was 
standard for lab experiments in economics. 
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enough to deter cheating, changing it will not have a significant effect on the social outcome. This 
holds true both for the behavior we find in the experiment and the formal analysis (appendix A). 
To assess the differences between the groups of uncooperative and cooperative individuals, we use 
two-tailed t-tests unless otherwise noted. 
Building Institutions 
First, we are able to replicate the substantial findings from Eriksson and Strimling (2012) in that 
both group types benefit from a stronger institution and that uncooperative groups benefit more 
than cooperative groups. In the first round, the average contribution in uncooperative groups start-
ing with a weak institution (M=3.64, SD =2.43) is significantly lower than that in low groups start-
ing with a strong institution (M=6.62, SD=2.86), a difference of 2.98, t(86)=5.3, p<0.001. Coopera-
tive groups exhibit a similar effect, but with a smaller difference (weak institution: M=6.26, 
SD=2.43, strong institution: M=8.13, SD=1.44), a difference of 1.87, t(68)=4, p<0.001.  The results 
are graphically displayed in Figure 1 
 
We are also able to substantially replicate the second finding from Eriksson and Strimling (2012) 
that uncooperative groups starting with a weak institution are less successful in building a strong 
institution than cooperative groups, even though they would benefit more than cooperative groups 
from a stronger institution and institution building is free. At the end of the game, uncooperative 
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groups typically have a significantly lower acceptance threshold (M=5.80, SD=2.90) compared to 
cooperative groups (M=8.50, SD=1.08), t(11)=2.8, p=0.02. The effect is even stronger for the fine, 
where uncooperative groups (M=5.00, SD=2.71) also are less successful than cooperative groups 
(M=8.20, SD=3.12), t(18)=2.4, p=0.03. Studying the evolution of the institution at a per group 
level, we find that it is common for the groups to reach a certain level and then stay there. Regres-
sion analysis show that the level of contribution depends on the type of group (b=0.45, t(37)=7, 
p<0.001) and the strength of the institution, here defined as A+F (b=0.70, t(37)=11, p<0.001), 
r^2=0.86. Uncooperative groups contribute less than cooperative groups with the same institution 
and are also less successful in building strong institutions. Thus the uncooperative groups are at a 
disadvantage compared to the cooperative groups both in terms of contributions and the ability to 
establish high levels of cooperation by creating institutions that regulate behavior.  
Maintaining Institutions 
The key contribution of our study is that the design allows us to test how successful the groups are 
at maintaining institutions given varying exogenously imposed institutions under the condition of 
political inclusion. When the groups start with a strong institution, the differences between the 
strength of the institutions in the last round diminish. The acceptance threshold in uncooperative 
groups (M=8.40, SD=0.70) did not differ significantly from that in the cooperative groups 
(M=8.50, SD=0.97), t(16)=0.26, p=0.80. The same holds for the fine, where there difference be-
tween uncooperative groups (M=9.90, SD=3.38) and cooperative groups (M=12.40, SD=4.06) is 
not significant, t(17)=1.5, p=0.15. Contrary to standard game theoretic predictions, both groups are 
thus able to maintain institutions if they are exogenously provided with strong institutions generat-
ing greater prosperity to begin with. 
Despite the fact that it was quite common for the institution to become weaker than its starting 
level at some point during the 20 rounds of the experiment, it was rare for the institution to end up 
weaker than the starting level. Among the groups starting with strong institutions that generate 
greater prosperity, six of the uncooperative groups and one of the cooperative groups at some 
point had an acceptance threshold lower than the starting level (A<8), but only one of the uncoop-
erative groups and one of the cooperative groups finished with A<8. Seven of the uncooperative 
groups and two of the cooperative groups voted for the fine to decrease past its starting level 
(F<9), in the last round three of the uncooperative groups and two of the cooperative groups had a 
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fine that was lower than the starting level. This shows that the strong institutions are not main-
tained because of any inherent difficulty in decreasing the strength of institutions. The groups had 
no problem decreasing either the fine or the acceptance threshold, but if they did, they often decid-
ed to return to the original, or a stronger institution. 
 
TABLE 3: STARTING WITH STRONG INSTITUTIONS: GROUP TYPE AND PATTERN OF MAIN-
TAINING INSTITUTIONS  
Group Type 
Was at some point lower than 
starting level 
Finished lower than starting 
level 
Acceptance threshold Uncooperative 6 1 
 Cooperative 1 1 
Fine Uncooperative 7 3 
 Cooperative 2 2 
 
Figure 2 displays the mean levels of the acceptance thresholds collectively decided by the partici-
pants through the institution guaranteeing political inclusion (voting) for uncooperative and coop-
erative groups across the 20 rounds of the regulated PG games when exposed to varying treat-
ments. It graphically illustrates the substantive differences between uncooperative groups exposed 
to weak institutions compared to the others. On average, the uncooperative groups are doing worst 
and are unable to build strong institutions whereas the cooperative groups build institutions strong 
as quickly as they can.  
The most interesting part of the story is the pattern displayed by uncooperative groups exposed to 
strong institutions. Initially, they tend to use political inclusion to vote down the acceptance thresh-
old but eventually manage to rebuild the weakened institution to its former level and frequently 
above. This demonstrates the key finding of our analysis: Even when uncooperative groups initially 
weaken an exogenously imposed strong institution (the acceptance threshold level), they quickly 
manage to “repair” it and even strengthen it further as displayed by the tightly dotted line. 
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Digging deeper and in order to show that the mean effect is not misrepresenting what is going on 
at the individual group-level, Figure 3 graphs acceptance thresholds for all groups starting with 
strong institutions, with uncooperative groups in the top graph and cooperative groups in the lower 
graph The reader should note that since many groups in round t chose the same acceptance thresh-
old, they cover each other so the number of lines appear fewer than they are. The display confirms 
that all but one of the cooperative groups either maintain or strengthen the institution, while unco-
operative groups often use political inclusion to first weaken the institution but then quickly rebuild 
it again. One of the uncooperative groups (ID=1586195) lower the acceptance threshold as far 
down as to five (A=5), but nevertheless end in round 20 of the PG game at the initial threshold of 
eight (A=8).  
 17 
 
A similar pattern emerges when graphing the results for mean fine levels are graphed by group and 
treatment as in Figure 4. Uncooperative groups are unable to build really strong and socially effi-
cient institutions when starting from initial conditions of a weak institutional setting, while groups 
of cooperative types typically manage do accomplish this.  
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When exposed to conditions of already strong and socially efficient institutions, both types of 
groups are able to maintain and even strengthen them. As above, uncooperative types first typically 
use political inclusion to weaken the institutions but then use the same process to rebuild and 
strengthen them again. The mean contribution across the 20 rounds of the regulated PG games 
with voting is the third and final indicator we use to test the causal mechanism of the Acemoglu 
and Robinson model. The results are graphed in Figure 5 and show the same kind of pattern as 
illustrated in the figure 3 and 4. 
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In part the results for this third indicator are following because of the acceptance thresholds and 
fine levels given that most players do not defect most of the time. But the mean contributions are 
of special significance because they show the de facto outcome in terms of actual contributions that 
either generates greater prosperity, along the lines of the Acemoglu and Robinson model, or rela-
tive poverty.  
Another way of looking at this is to compare within cooperative and uncooperative groups starting 
with strong vs. weak institutions. Both groups can reach the maximum acceptance threshold, A=9. 
Therefore, there should not be a difference in last round acceptance threshold between groups 
starting in the weak institution treatment, assuming they are efficient in constructing the institu-
tions. Figure 6 shows the average acceptance threshold in the last round. In cooperative groups we 
find no such difference between the weak (M=8.5, SD=1.08) and strong institution (M=8.5, 
SD=0.97) treatments t(18)=0, p=1.0 However, in uncooperative groups there is a statistically signif-
icant difference between weak (M=5.8, SD=2.90) and strong (M=8.4, SD=0.70) starting institu-
tions, t(10)=2.8, p=.02. The uncooperative groups do not seem to have a set level that they try to 
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reach. Rather, there is a distribution of different levels that they will finish at. When starting with a 
strong institution, this distribution is shifted, resulting in significantly stronger institutions than 
when starting with weak institutions. The results show that while uncooperative groups are less 
successful in building institutions that regulate cooperation, they are able to maintain such institu-
tions if they are already in place and will even manage to rebuild them if they decline.  
 
 
Conclusions 
Why are some societies rich and others poor? Following the institutionalist turn in political science 
from the early 1990s, Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory has emerged as the perhaps one of the 
most believed explanation: Only in nations where inclusive politics disperse power over a larger 
share of populations are pro-growth inclusive and marked-based economic institutions reproduced 
in the long run. Yet, their model does not resolve the issue of whether there is a necessary sequence 
of adoption of the “right” economic institutions and the “right” political institutions. Given the 
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emphasis on “getting politics right” in the international development and aid community during the 
last two decades, the lack of empirical support for this policy doctrine is problematic. This is espe-
cially troublesome since we lack evidence that the significant steps forward in terms of political 
inclusiveness in many countries since the start of the “third wave of democratization” has led to 
improvements in economic growth (Norris 2012; Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu 2008; Przeworski & 
Limongi 1993). Their theory, which is based on extensive historical research, is also silent on what 
to do to break vicious circles in countries characterized by exclusionary political institutions, low 
societal trust and extractive economic systems.  
In the end, the problem boils down to a micro level issue about causal mechanisms: How do 
groups of low-trust, defect-prone individuals respond to changes in the strength and social efficien-
cy of institutions? This paper reports on a set of laboratory experiments that test the suggested 
causal mechanism in the Acemoglu and Robinson model at the micro level, and at the same time 
offers a better understanding on the issue of sequence.  
The first main result replicating earlier studies corroborates the historical analyses by Acemoglu and 
Robinson. Groups (aka societies) of uncooperative, defect-prone and low-trust individuals tend to 
be unable to use political inclusion in order to build the strong and efficient economic institutions 
that they so badly need to improve collective outcomes. 
Our second main finding, however, is that when endowed with strong, socially efficient economic 
institutions at the outset, even these collective action-failure-prone groups are capable of using 
political inclusion to maintain and even strengthen socially efficient economic institutions and achieve 
collectively high-yielding outcomes. 
These experiments thus provide the first micro level evidence produced in controlled circumstances 
corroborating the Acemoglu and Robinson theory. It also takes us one step further in suggesting 
that while political inclusion is useful for generating growth and collective well-being, it is not a 
remedy that works unless economic institutions have been made strong and relatively uncorrupt 
first.  
The external validity of laboratory experiments can always be questioned and this is no exception. 
Reality is, of course, much more complex and many more variables are at play. However, the point 
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of our set-up is not first and foremost to recreate reality but to approximate a test of the causal 
mechanisms suggested by the emerging dominant theory in the field at the micro level. 
Since institutions are “man-made”, it seems simple – poor countries could just import the type of 
institutions that are known to produce economic prosperity and human well-being.  But the intro-
duction of “good institutions” has turned out to be a much more complicated and difficult affair 
than expected.  (Grindle 2004; Mungiu-Pippidi 2011). In particularly problematic result is that the 
introduction of representative democracy is not a sure cure against “bad governance” and corrup-
tion (Sung 2004; Montinola & Jackson 2002).  This remains true and illustrates another aspect of 
the external validity issue for our findings, where the introduction of voting did not lead to in-
creased efficiency for groups of uncooperative subjects.  
In the experiment, players can trust completely that the institutions (strong or weak) are upheld. 
Checks and punishments are carried out impartially and without risks of being corrupted or influ-
enced by ties be it to kinship groups, unions, or politicians. This is hardly always the case in the real 
world. For any policy implications, therefore, we need to recognize that at a minimum societies of 
defect-prone uncooperative individuals need not only the “right” economic and political institu-
tions but also probably need to experience impartial enforcement of the same institutions for an 
extended period before the effects we have seen in the lab would materialize. 
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